There is no doubt that one of the most contentious terrains of contestation in the supposed clash of values between Islamism and
On the one hand, the Muslim Woman was portrayed as being a powerless victim in a highly patriarchal society and therefore not a political nor social subject in her own right. On the other hand, the Muslim Woman was portrayed as a depraved sexual temptress. While colonial authorities were only very marginally interested in the idea of the 'liberation' of women for a long period of time, their interest in the gender question increased when the local nationalist movements began to grow and seriously challenge the colonial powers. 4 At the time, the question of women's role in society emerged as contentious, with colonial authorities attempting to utilise 'women's rights' to weaken nationalist demands.
Conversely, nationalist movements emphasised the role of women in the liberation struggle as they became the 'mothers of the country' that would be born out of the liberation and anti-colonial struggle. This trend was most evident in Algeria where French occupation lasted for over a century, where the war of liberation was prolonged and where women in the Algerian liberation movement had a prominent role. According to Kandiyoti by virtue of her biological role as creator of life the 'Woman', in nationalist discourse, reproduces ethnic boundaries and passes down culture to the progeny. 5 The Woman is therefore the representative of national differences, but her full citizenship is not guaranteed. There are obviously national differences in the Muslim and Arab world relating to the emergence of the gender question during colonial times, but there is nevertheless a similar trajectory in so far as the Woman, in its social and political role, seems to become the point of contestation for different sets of values.
Along similar lines, the issue of gender has taken again centre stage more recently. The previous 'essentialisation' of women by the colonial West and the indigenous nationalist movements is again played out today in the context of liberal globalisation. Thus, the issue of women's rights has become the litmus test of the supposed homogeneity of the current zeitgeist of human rights in the new economic liberal context. This dominant discourse of liberal and democratic globalisation goes hand in hand with the separation of Church and State, which is believed to be a necessary component of modern governance. 6 It follows that countries across the globe are encouraged to replicate the Western model of social and political development because it is the only avenue that can lead to the establishment of an effective liberal-democratic state with all the perceived positive benefits this has. The relegation of religion to the private sphere is conceived of as a condicio sine qua non for democracy and the emergence of political-religious actors is perceived as a threat to such modernisation because they promote illiberal policies, which fundamentally undermine the perceived unbreakable bond between democracy and liberal rights. In the Muslim world today, the strength of Islamist movements and their defence of traditions are often considered an obstacle to democracy because, on the whole, Islamists reject many of the values of liberal globalisation. This creates a stereotypical view of debates surrounding women's rights 7 in the Arab world where two distinct camps are in conflict with each other. On the one hand there are 'globalised' liberal and secular actors that strive for women's rights and therefore democracy, while on the other are obscurantiste religious movements that are anchored in tradition, resist globalisation and are therefore autocratic by assumption. 8 Building on Svensson, who argued 'that the problem is often presented as primarily an ideological one, a conflict between a local tradition, Islam, and the global demands for human rights', 9 this article challenges the dichotomy that is prevalent in studies surrounding the issue of women's rights in the Arab world in the context of globalisation and democratisation. In order to do so, it will demonstrate that, first of all, there exist alternatives to the mainstream discourse of liberal globalisation and that other 'types' of globalisation can be just as valid and politically effective, namely a type of Islamic globalisation based on extensive transnational links. This means that, paradoxically, secular actors might be working against the introduction of democracy.
Third, the supposedly anti-women ethos of Islamist movements needs to be disputed for two reasons. Firstly, their opposition to modifications in the traditional legislation of personal status issues is derived from political considerations rather than from an ideological position related to the role of women in society. Secondly, for some movements this issue is not as relevant as others might be, such as genuine access to the political system. This is due to the fact that not all Islamist movements share the same ideological tenets or the same policies and that they operate in different national contexts.
By focusing on the cases of Morocco and Tunisia, where women's rights are prominent in the public debate between different political actors, both religious and secular, the article will illustrate how these actors operate within the constraints and opportunities that globalisation provides. The picture that emerges is a much more complex one than the simple dichotomy highlighted above.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
While there are a significant number of different definitions and interpretations of globalisation 12 it can be convincingly argued that, from a purely political point of view, there exist core elements to it coinciding with the experience and institutions of established liberal democracies. There is very little doubt that the most significant core element of globalisation is the global integration of previously 'closed' national economies and the profound transformations that this passage to one world economy entails. This process has been driven since the late 1970s by the shifting paradigm of economic organisation, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. Subsequently, the Single European Act of 1987 signalled that continental Europe was ready to embrace neo-liberal economics and the collapse of the Soviet block accelerated the export of neo-liberalism to all corners of the globe.
The opening up of national economies in order to reap the benefits of integration would also lead, according to this mainstream interpretation of globalisation, to social and political benefits as well.
According to this view, the creation of a neo-liberal economy where transnational linkages are of the utmost importance in both trade and finance requires the establishment of the rule of law. 13 In turn, once the rule of law is established, democracy and human rights will most likely follow. There is therefore a very intimate and almost natural connection to the idea that globalisation contributes to the expansion of democracy and human rights. Griswold states that 'the connection between trade, development, and political reform is not just a throwaway line. In theory and in practice, economic and political freedoms reinforce one another.' 14 
It
follows that democratisation fuels even more globalisation and development in a mutually reinforcing process. 15 Policy makers in the western world subscribe quite fully to this idea, which is also rhetorically embraced in a number of developing countries where current authoritarian rulers, forced to open up the country's economy, feel the need to continue to justify and legitimise their rule by making references to democratic discourse and practices even though they might not uphold them in reality. 16 This interpretation of what we term liberal globalisation is disputed in many quarters, but it is undeniable that is dominant in policy-making circles. Thus, the architecture of international structures of governance comprises not only formal and empirical studies indicate that the degree of religiosity of ordinary citizens does not influence their preference for democracy, which is considered to be a desirable form of government by the majority of MENA citizens. 21 Second, in the aggregate, it is quite impossible to determine the nature of a political movement in isolation and it is therefore specious to argue that Islamist movements are naturally authoritarian and the secular ones naturally democratic. The need for context is paramount and when this institutional context is taken into account, the simplistic distinction between authoritarian Islamists and democratic seculars is no longer convincing. 22 In fact, when one analyses the relationships between political actors in the MENA, it emerges that quite often avowedly secular parties and associations side with authoritarian ruling elites, perceived to be defending some sort of state's laicité against Islamist aggression.
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The best example of this type of behaviour is in Algeria where almost all secular parties and personalities called for the military to carry out a military coup in order to stop the Islamist FIS from taking legitimate power through the ballot box in 1992. 24 Conversely, Islamist movements are increasingly calling for democratic practices and procedures to be implemented while, at the same time, adapting their discourse to one more attuned towards global, and by implication liberal, human rights. This is most evident in the Turkish case, 25 but it is increasingly so across the Arab world. This does not mean that the Islamist rhetoric on democracy should be 'politically' believed, but it simply indicates that the dichotomy pro-democratic secularism versus authoritarian Islamism is problematic. In spite both of this and of studies confirming the democratic potential of Islamist movements, 26 Western institutions, both state and non-state, deal almost exclusively with secular associations and ruling regimes, because they are perceived as truly democratic or potentially so.
This practice contributes to reinforce the divide between different sectors of society in the MENA, particularly within the opposition, while allowing ruling elites to divide and conquer 'genuine' opposition movements. 27 The simplistic and politically motivated manner in which Islamist and secular activism at the level of party politics and civil society in the Arab world is constructed is very much in evidence when it comes to the issue of women's rights, which have become a terrain for the struggle between secularism and religious tradition with profound implications for democratisation. The opportunities that liberal globalisation has provided for secular women's rights organisations in the MENA to achieve a complete reform of personal status legislation or an amelioration of existing legal provisions have been numerous and effective. Al-Ali argues that one of the factors 'which have helped the rise of independent women's organisations in some countries is the increased influence of international constituencies'. 28 In addition, the United Nations claims that 'four world conferences on women convened by the UN in the past quarter of a century have been instrumental in elevating the cause of gender equality to the very centre of the global agenda.' 
WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN MOROCCO AND TUNISIA
Despite a similar historical background that saw both countries becoming colonies of France and achieve independence in the same year (1956), the trajectory of women's rights and personal status legislation in the post-colonial period took a very different route in Morocco and Tunisia. As Charrad demonstrated in her study, enjoyed over tribes and lineages while the King of newly independent Morocco needed tribal support to outmanoeuvre the nationalist parties and remain the sole political arbiter of the new system. 34 The source of tribal power stems from the inability of the individual to choose autonomously the creation of marriage bonds because marriage must be functional to the collective tribal interests. This means that, politically, the tribe can provide support for ruling elites in exchange for the maintenance of personal status legislation that privileges collective rights over individual rights. Where, as in Tunisia, the nationalist movement did not need the support of tribal power, its leaders were able to shape personal status legislation in order to implement their vision of a modern Tunisia. As Grami asserts, 'the Code of Personal Status (CPS) was not a response from the state to women's claims and pressures, but a political decision taken by political leaders and urban reformists.' 35 Where, as in Morocco, two loci of power, the monarchy and the nationalist parties, battled it out for supremacy in the post-colonial political system, the support of tribes became a decisive factor to determine the winner. After independence, as Chaarani explains, Muslim scholars toyed with the idea of 'Islamicising' the entire corpus of Moroccan legislation, but the project was never carried out because of the opposition of large sectors of the nationalist movement. The scholars were made accept French codes and legislation, but obtained that the CPS would not be modified along the lines of the Tunisian one. 36 Consequently the development of the women's rights issue in the two countries, including the activism of both liberal/secular women's rights associations and Islamists, has differed considerably over time. In Tunisia, women's organisations were quite quickly integrated into the corporatist structures of the state because they were considered to be a vital contributor to the development of the nation. This feminism from above was instrumental to the project of Tunisian national development that the ruling elites had in mind. 37 It follows that the state became the guarantor of women's rights with the CPS being the most liberal in the Arab world and a pillar of the modernising image of Tunisia. This means that there was little militant activism on the part of women's organisations on the issue of women's rights, as the State had granted them an egalitarian CPS and had no intention of revoking it.
In Morocco, women's rights activism was channelled through opposition left-wing parties in opposition to the Monarchy and this greater struggle against authoritarian rule took precedence for quite some time over the struggle for gender equality. 38 The failure of Moroccan political parties to incorporate gender issues in a serious and coherent manner provoked the growing disaffection of many female party members, who, over time left the parties to become civil society activists in order to promote their agenda of gender equality. In addition, the increasing difficulties that Europe placed on the movement of people between the two banks of the Mediterranean drove large sectors of the bourgeoisie of the Maghreb towards the Gulf and Egypt where they came into contact with different cultural models that tend to replace the Western one. 43 In the face of these perceived political and social threats, it is no surprise that a coincidence of interests between the regime, afraid of the growth of political Islam, and the secular elements of society, under threat from an expanding social model which they could and still cannot reconcile, developed over time. The terrain of women's rights became the theatre where these relations are played out.
The combined effect of these global forces structures the behaviour of the local actors, resulting in dynamics that in both Tunisia and Morocco are at time similar and at times radically different. This is because when globalisation encounters the local, the indigenous context reacts differently. In 1993, both the Tunisian republican regime and the Moroccan monarchy, having understood the importance of women's rights in the polarising contest between secular and Islamist opposition carried out a limited, but very important and symbolic reform of the CPS. In Tunisia, the CPS was amended, for example, by the abolition of the wife's duty to obedience. Also, a fund was introduced to secure alimony for divorced women and their children.
In Morocco, the most important innovations to the CPS were the introduction of the public and explicit assent of the bride to marriage and the abolition of the institution of the wali (legal tutor) for orphaned women. In addition restrictions were placed on polygamy and repudiation. Obviously, the reforms in Tunisia simply built on an existing liberal code while the reforms in Morocco only introduced minor changes to a restrictive code. Nevertheless, the process of reform was highly symbolical because it signalled that both regimes were on the side of women's rights and only through the current rulers further changes could be achieved. The signal was for the benefit of both domestic actors and the international community.
In Tunisia, the reform was a continuation of a long-standing policy of the regime, which had, since independence, promoted gender equality and it reasserted that this was a priority at a time when opposition to the regime was increasing, because of the absence of political pluralism. In this context it is interesting to note that the Islamists in Tunisia were used as the bogey men of women's rights in order to solidify the alliance with large sectors of urban francophone women, although
Islamists at the time in Tunisia were not really concerned with the issue of the CPS. Personnel.' 45 In spite of the absence of hostility towards the CPS on the part of the Tunisia Islamists, the issue has continued to be present in Tunisian politics and is repeatedly used by the regime to polish its external image. This is successful for two reasons. On the one hand, there has been an effective Islamisation from below in Tunisia and displays of public piety are on the increase; Islam is much more public than it was a decade ago. This is due to the very significant presence of media from the Gulf offering an image of the role and behaviour of women that is much more traditional and conservative. A number of ordinary Tunisians have been influenced in their life-style choices by this. 46 This Islamisation is perceived to be a problem by a number of secular women's rights groups in the country and worries the Tunisian left. 47 On the other hand, there is a fracture in the CPS between the de jure provisions and the reality on the ground because 'Tunisian society seems to resist State-enacted legal rules in a field where ancestral habits, somewhat redefined, still persist.' 48 All this is not the product of Islamist activism, which is heavily repressed in Tunisia and has been for two decades, but Islamism is still quite a useful scapegoat for the regime.
There are certainly real fears of extremism in certain secular sectors of civil society, but they tend to be exploited by the regime.
In Morocco the issue of women's rights has been prominent since 1993, which is considered 'year zero' by Nezha Sqalli in terms of the promotion of women's rights. 49 The 1993 reform was a mixed bag for the women's rights movement. On the one hand, they were dissatisfied with the breadth of the reforms, which did not go far enough to even begin to dismantle the patriarchal nature of the Code. On the other hand however, they were very grateful for the intervention of the King because his legitimacy silenced the verbal attacks to which they had been subjected by the religious legitimacy to deal with the issue, the monarch certainly marginalised the women's rights movement, but, at the same time, he put an end to the Islamists' threats and accusations against women's rights groups and admitted that changes were needed. The reaction to the strategy of instrumental use of the women's rights issues in Tunisian and Moroccan associational life presents a number of interesting variations despite the fact that there is an overarching similarity in the outcomes, which have seen a strong rapprochement between women's rights groups and ruling regimes that have strengthened authoritarian practices rather than weakening them. 54 In Tunisia, the domestic environment allows women to openly declare and 'live' their laicité 55 and to subscribe to the values that the regime also supports when it comes to the issue of women's rights. However, the Tunisian domestic structures also heavily constrain, much more than in Morocco, public debate and political pluralism on all other issues. It is a highly authoritarian regime with no toleration for domestic voices This means that they do not seek a confrontation with them nor they seek a dialogue 56 and barely acknowledge their existence. For example, when human rights of Islamists are abused, women's rights groups remain largely silent, indicating thus that their priorities lie with the narrower interests of women's rights rather than broad human rights. This also explains why their declarations on further changes on the family code such as equal treatment in inheritance legislation are often attacked by Islamists, while when other human rights groups call for the same changes there is no such strong reaction from Islamists given that the framing of the discourse is different and that changing the family code again is only one of the many objectives of organisations broadly defending human rights. 57 Secondly, women's rights groups take advantage of the opportunities that this new situation has created and utilise the very discourse of the monarchy about development and gender to advance their agenda. Women's rights groups are relatively powerful political entrepreneurs, often able to obtain significant benefits despite the absence of widespread popularity within society. This is due largely to the support they have within the regime, which uses the issue of women's rights to gain external legitimacy and, at the same time, to gain the 
CONCLUSION
The outcome of these dynamic relations is that there is a very significant decoupling between women's rights and procedural democracy/democratisation. 
